We examine how firms manage their intellectual property rights (IPR) by observing patent renewal decisions. We suggest that firms employ a combination of two strategies in managing their IPR portfolio. Specifically, they build domain-specific patent thickets by renewing patents in their core area of expertise and those situated in more fragmented technological markets. At the same time, firms consider patents as real options by renewing those that present greater breadth in terms of technological opportunities and those in areas with fast technological clockspeed. We test these predictions by analyzing the renewal decisions for the population of over 2 million patents approved by the United States Patent and Trademark Office between 1987 and 2006.
Introduction
Technology-based firms widely use patents to protect their intellectual property (IP) assets. In the U.S. and many other countries, patent holders can exclude others from using their inventions up to twenty years once patented. However, patent holders must periodically pay renewal fees to maintain their patent rights. For instance, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) requires U.S. patent holders to pay $1,600, $3,600, and $7,400 in renewal fees 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years after the grant date respectively to maintain their patent rights.
1 These costs do not include indirect costs such as labor costs related to attorneys and IP management officers examining renewal decisions. Given these nontrivial costs related to maintaining patents, firms make discrete decisions on whether to renew a particular patent or not at each renewal period. Indeed, fewer than half of over 100,000 patents granted in 1997 enjoyed the full enforcement life span of twenty years because patent holders decided not to renew their patents at some point during the life span.
We examine how firms manage their IP portfolio by probing patent renewal decisions.
Investigating the renewal decisions of over 2 million patents approved by the USPTO between 1987 and 2006, we provide theory and empirical evidence that firms actively manage their intellectual property rights (IPR) by combining two strategies. First, we posit that firms develop their own local patent thickets 2 by renewing patents in their core area of expertise and those in technologically fragmented markets. A patent thicket is formed when multiple firms concurrently develop inventions with overlapping patent claims in a technological domain (Shapiro 2000, Hall Helmers Graevenitz and Rosazza-Bondibene 2013) . Firms can strengthen their own thickets by maintaining patents in the domains where they hold other related patents and those in fragmented markets to increase their bargaining power 1 These figures are for large firms. Small firms are subject to a reduced maintenance fee schedule. 2 Patent fencing is a defensive patent filing strategy by firms that intend to use a set of related patents to enhance value appropriation ex ante (Sternitzke 2013) . As a result, multiple parties can own partially substitutable patents in a specific technological domain. As several firms continuously file moderately overlapping patents (expansion), fragmentation of patent ownership intensifies and triggers the firms to develop their own territorial aggregation of related patents ex post by renewing those granted patents in the domain (extension) . In this study, we regard the development of a domain-specific patent thicket as an offensive patent renewal strategy.
to prevent hold-up problem (Williamson 1975 ) that may arise in IP markets (Ziedonis 2004) . Our empirical results are consistent with these conjectures.
Second, we posit that firms consider patents as real options. Given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding successful commercialization using a particular invention and subsequent technological advances from that invention, firms often face challenges in determining the intrinsic value of their own inventions. Although buying a call option by renewing a patent can be costly, firms would be more likely to do so if they believe that the upside potential for economic returns from the patent is high. We deem that such a condition arises when a patent provides broad technological opportunities (Fleming 2001, Afuah and Tucci 2011) and when the velocity of technological changes in the domain of the focal patent is high. Our empirical results indicate that firms are indeed more likely to renew their patents when they provide broad technological opportunities, but they are more likely to renew patents in technological domains with high velocity only for their second and third renewals, conditional on the patents renewed in the first and the second renewal. We discuss reasons why that may be so.
By examining patent renewal decisions by firms as an IP management strategy, this study contributes to the literature on innovation and technology management. First, it contributes to the literature stream examining patent renewals. Although a number of studies have considered patent renewals (Pakes Simpson Judd and Mansfield 1989 , Schankerman 1998 , Cornelli and Schankerman 1999 , Scotchmer 1999 , Serrano 2010 , Hall and Harhoff 2012 , most are merely descriptive in nature and consider the phenomenon at an aggregate level. Only recently, studies have begun considering firm-level patent renewal decisions. For instance, firms are more likely to renew their patents when there are greater interdependencies within their existing knowledge base in the context of pharmaceutical industry (Khanna Guler and Nerkar 2018) . Our study extends this line of inquiry by taking into account firm-level decisions considering the characteristics of individual patents as well as those of other patents in the focal firm's portfolio. Second and more broadly, this study provides insights on ex post IP strategy employed by firms. Although innovation management scholars have studied appropriability conditions using patenting or secrecy strategies (e.g., Teece 1986 , Pisano 2006 , most have focused on how firms choose their IP strategy before conducting their invention activities or at the time when invention is completed (Cohen Nelson and Walsh 2000, Ziedonis 2004 ). Our study complements these studies by providing insights on how firms make ongoing decisions about their IPR following an initial strategy.
We begin by providing background on patent renewals and developing hypotheses on how firms use patent thicket and real options strategies that affect their patent renewal decisions. We then present our dataset and empirical results. We conclude by discussing this study's contributions, limitations, and future research directions.
Background and Hypotheses

Patent Renewals
A patent is a partial output of R&D effort by a firm that assesses technological progress and indicates a valid economic value (Danguy de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2013). However, firms do not seek to obtain relatively watertight and exclusive rights to their IP in all proprietary inventions. Indeed, survey-based studies indicate that secrecy strategy is at least as prevalent as patenting strategy for firms to protect their IP (Levin Klevorick Nelson and Winter 1987, Cohen et al. 2000) .
Nonetheless, firms have increasingly relied on patents to protect their IP, particularly in industries where inventions can be easily codified and where a link between patents and inventive returns is transparent, such as the semiconductor industry Ziedonis 2001, Heeley Matusik and Jain 2007) .
In most jurisdictions around the world, patents give the right to exclude others from using their inventions up to twenty years. However, this life span of a patent is not automatically granted at the approval. Indeed, patent holders must pay periodic maintenance fees to renew their patent rights. These maintenance fees have been a typical feature of patent laws in most European countries for years, but were introduced into the U.S. patent laws relatively recently. The USPTO adopted a patent renewal system from the European patent systems (Scotchmer 1999) by instituting the maintenance fees in patent laws in 1980 and 1982 : P.L. 96-517 and P.L. 97-247 (Pakes et al. 1989 ).
Inventors typically apply for a patent at an early stage of the invention process when the uncertainty about the value of a particular invention is high. As a result, patent holders are often dubious about the economic returns that can be generated for holding the patents (Pakes 1986 ). The economic value of patented inventions tends to be divulged over time and the patent holders need to make decisions throughout the life span of the patents on whether they will renew their patents by paying renewal fees to the corresponding patent office, or let their patent rights lapse and avoid nontrivial renewal costs. In the case of the USPTO, one utility patent can be enforced up to twenty years, from the earliest application filing date, subject to the timely payment of maintenance fees. Although the accumulated fees of a patent for that maximum life span are $14,200 as of 2018, indirect costs for IPR management can be substantial considering the sunk costs related to the labor performed by patent attorneys and IP managers in determining the renewal decisions.
Paradoxically, studies show that many patents have little or no economic value. Only a handful of them directly related to a firm's current core business are ultimately used for product commercialization or licensed (Pakes et al. 1989) . The average value of a patent in European countries is estimated to be distant from exorbitant and the distribution of values is dispersed and right-skewed (Pakes 1986 ).
Specifically, only the top one percent of patent applications has pecuniary values above $65,000 in France and the U.K., and $118,000 in Germany; 75 percent of patents has a value under $3,731, $7,948, and $19,576 in France, the U.K., and Germany respectively. Accordingly, skilled personnel must determine whether a particular patent should be renewed or not. The European Patent Office has an annual renewal fee system during the twenty-year term from the filing date with a single fee schedule regardless of the type of patent or patent assignee, whereas the USPTO requires payment of each renewal fee at three times, on the third, seventh, and eleventh year, during the twenty-year full term of a utility patent. When maintenance fees and any applicable surcharges are not paid in a timely manner, the patent protection lapses, and the exclusive rights provided by the patent is no longer enforceable.
To date, most studies on patent renewal have drawn inferences about the distribution of patent values (Pakes and Schankerman 1984 , Pakes 1986 , Schankerman and Pakes 1986 , Lanjouw Pakes and Putnam 1998 , Lanjouw 1998 , Schankerman, 1998 , Hegde and Sampat 2009 . These studies on patent maintenance statute indicate that the patent renewal system plays an important role in practice.
Specifically, fewer than half of eligible patents are renewed for more than ten years across technology classes in Germany (Lanjouw 1998) and France (Schankerman 1998) , and less than 70 percent of patents in France and 11 percent in Germany are renewed for their allowed maximal life span (Pakes 1986 ).
Likewise, although there are considerable discrepancies in renewal rates of patents across technology and the nationality of the assignee, the proportion of patents renewed to full life cycle is merely 30 percent (Schankerman 1998) . In the U.S., the proportion of patents fully maintained has increased gradually from 34.3 percent in 1981 to 49.63 percent in 2001 according to the USPTO. These findings suggest differences in the renewal decision on patents stem not only from different nationalities of patent assignees but also from industries in which the patent holders conduct business. Such differences partially lead to variation in the importance in the role that patents play in each industry. Specifically, the value of a patent tends to be high in knowledge-intensive industries (such as pharmaceutical, chemical, mechanical, and electronic industries) as compared with low-tech or labor-intensive industries (Cohen et al. 2000) . Further, depending on different attributes of a particular industry (e.g., different degrees of knowledge tacitness and imitability, existence of entry barriers, and so on), these findings imply that a strategic element might play a pivotal role in patent renewal decisions. For instance, strategic decisions about which patents to be maintained during their lifetime can be contingent on the size of the relevant market for the patented inventions and the intensity of competition in the marketplace (Ellis 2016) .
Furthermore, firms' IPR management strategy have multiple facets. For instance, some engage in patent races with their competitors and use patents as a bargaining chip for potential cross licensing (Shapiro 2000 , Tennent 2009 ) or as a means of patent litigation defense mechanism (Somaya 2003) , whereas others simply use patents as a signal to obtain external resources (Hsu and Ziedonis 2013) . As such, strategic motives for patent renewal decisions must be examined. In the next two sections, we develop empirical predictions on how firms develop patent thickets and retain real options influencing their patent renewal decisions.
Patent Renewals to Develop Patent Thickets
Patent thickets refer to the dense web of overlapping patent rights (Shapiro 2000 , Hall et al. 2013 . Prior studies find that patent thickets help firms consolidate a dominant position in a fragmented market to defend against potential infringers (Ziedonis 2004, Galasso and Schankerman 2010) . This is because dispersed IPR held by multiple firms with overlapping patent claims would create hold-up problems (Williamson 1975) in that infringement on those claims would be more difficult to be resolved through litigation or other resolutions. In such cases, a dominant firm with numerous patents in a specific technological area could more easily defend its IPR. For instance, as manifested in the case of the sewing machine patent gridlock in the 1850s (Mossoff 2011) , the enhanced bargaining position could engender reduced negotiation costs related to either patent litigation or patent licensing terms. In a similar vein, the possession of multiple patents in the patent thickets could not only deter probable legal proceedings but also stave off obstructed access to technologies by competitors. Further, the dominant firm with numerous patents in the patent thickets could delay market entry by other firms in the technological sphere while holding scientific and technological expansion of its current IPR.
We suggest that firms can strengthen their local patent thickets in the technology landscape by adopting two strategies with respect to their patent renewal decisions. First, we posit that firms will be more likely to renew patents in a technological area where they are more familiar, evidenced by holding other related patents in that area. Firms typically confront technological uncertainty stemming from their search processes with unusual or novel recombination of knowledge components (Fleming 2001) .
Although the process of distant search, or exploration (March 1991) , can sometimes yield valuable new knowledge, firms are more likely to be able to discern the potential utility and recognize opportunities for commercialization in technological areas that they had worked before (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) . As a result, firms are more likely to find patents in familiar areas, where they hold other related patents, more valuable as compared with those in unfamiliar areas. Indeed, patents that are directly related to a firm's core business tend to be used for product commercialization or are licensed (Pakes et al. 1989) .
From a defensive standpoint, forming an overlapping subset of patents in a concentrated technological area where a firm has cumulative knowledge will facilitate the protection of its IP assets against potential infringers. Due to transaction costs and uncertainties surrounding litigation outcomes, firms possessing multiple patents in the concentrated technological area could more easily defend their IPR against infringers Ziedonis 2001, Galasso and Schankerman 2010) , or even deter competition from entering into that area (Arora 1997 Likewise, we posit that renewing patents located in more fragmented technological markets would help firms build their own domain-specific patent thickets. Technological fragmentariness refers to the magnitude of divergent distribution of patent ownership in a particular technological domain. When a market for technology is highly fragmented, prior art that is beyond the command of a patent holder within the market is extensively dispersed. As such, different firms hold patents with overlapping claims in a particular technological domain (Shapiro 2000 , Hall et al. 2013 . A set of claims in a granted patent delimits an exclusive legal right and determines the technological scope of the invention. When a firm attempts to commercialize its own invention building on multiple prior art with overlapping patent claims, the firm may not pay royalties for using prior art because no single firm can alone legitimately assert the rights for the overlapping claims and obtain licenses from manifold patent holders. Further, the level of dispersion of the exclusive rights among patent holders shapes the negotiation power over the technological domain (Buchanan and Yoon 2000, Shapiro 2000) . However, estimating the economic value of infringement becomes more difficult when multiple firms claim rights to related IP (Teece 1986, Merges and Nelson 1990) . Thus, a fragmented pool of patented inventions hinders a firm's ex ante value estimation with reference to both its proprietary exclusive rights and the focal technological domain. In such a case, firms tend to expand their patent portfolios to attenuate hazards in external markets for technology, thereby improving their ex post bargaining position (Ziedonis 2004) . Indeed, amassing patents to building a lager portfolio is deemed as an endeavor to create a de facto "exchange of hostage" (Williamson 1983) . Under a high degree of technological fragmentation, an incentive for firms to aggressively extend the life of their patents is likely to be derived from the ex post bargaining power on which they may need to depend for prospective negotiations associated with litigations or utilization including licensing and commercialization. Hence, when the external markets for technology are highly fragmented. That is, exclusive rights granted within given technological areas are broadly scattered, we expect that firms that draw on profoundly disintegrated technologies will more likely renew their patents as compared with firms that confront more convergent external markets for technology.
Hypothesis 2. Firms are more likely to renew patents in technology areas with a high degree of fragmentation.
Patent Renewals as Real Options
"It is understood that patented inventions may have limited lifetimes and that there is natural speculation involved when filing patent applications as to which patents will turn out to be valuable enough to maintain…Abandonment is thus a common and desirable aspect of patent systems, incorporating the flexibility needed to reflect advances in innovation in the marketplace." − Marian Underweiser, IBM Senior Counsel for IP Policy and Strategy Patent utilization is often characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, particularly with regard to the value appropriation of the patented technology or market demand for licensing. On a balance sheet, a patent is recorded as an intangible asset whenever purchased, which reflects that the patent has future economic value to its owner. IP managers appear to regard patent renewals as real options and allocate their finite resources among diverse technological opportunities after considering commercial and technological values of their patents. Overall, sequential investments in the patented technology may be made in new and uncertain technological domains, particularly those that might be of strategic importance to firms in the future. In this vein, patent renewals can be deemed as analogous to buying a call option in which a firm obtains the right, but not the obligation, to utilize its proprietary patented invention at a specified cost within a limited time frame.
A firm holding patents typically stages its financing for patent renewal in a sequential manner, which can provide several types of real options to deal with uncertainty. Specifically, once a patent is conferred, the firm can opt for one of the following two outcome decisions in the post-conferment stage.
On the one hand, the firm has the right to make a subsequent investment and to increase the level of potential, while containing relevant costs and downside risk. Whereas firms can reduce the downside losses when they opt to cease further sequential investment in the related technology area, their sequential resource commitments can increase with the value with increases in the variance of results (Mitchell and Hamilton 1988) . Accordingly, the presence of high variance in potential outcomes of investment is positively associated with the resource commitments from a real options perspective (Morris Teisberg and Kolbe 1991) .
A test for the presence of a real options perspective in R&D strategy may examine whether firms making resource commitment decisions favor distant knowledge search with a breadth beyond their current domains of knowledge search (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . The distant search behavior of firms tend to resolve scientific problems in a significant manner (Katila and Ahuja 2002) or unlock new streams of technological opportunities (Fleming 2001, Afuah and Tucci 2012) , thereby increasing the potential variance of upside returns. As a result, the greater the breadth of technological opportunities, the greater the potential upside of resource commitments. Hence, ceteris paribus, we expect that greater breadth of upside potential that a patent in the (new) technological area grants increases the option value of such a patent and its likelihood of being renewed.
Hypothesis 3. Firms are more likely to renew patents in technology areas with broader technological opportunities.
The rate of technological change is generally far from consistent and difficult to be predicted irrespective of the industry (Kurzweil 2000) . Even within an identical technology sphere, the pace of technological change can vary tremendously depending on various factors. By drawing on the concept of industry clockspeed (Fine 1998 , Carrillo 2005 advancements and infringements by other firms take time to be identified and divulged. As a result, the value of a patent in an area where technologies change rapidly is more difficult to be determined as compared to its counterpart in an area where technologies change slowly. Given the high uncertainty associated with fast-changing technologies that may in turn result in higher variance in the expected value of a patent, the option value of the patent in fast-changing technology will be higher than that of a slowly changing one.
These two countervailing forces are likely to affect patent renewal decisions in the opposite directions. However, we posit that patents in faster technological clockspeed will generally have greater option value and hence more likely to be renewed. This is because the upside potential and flexibility with which such patents are associated are likely to outweigh the losses from possible obsoleteness of such patents. Because the distribution on the value of patents is highly skewed in that a few will generate the majority of value from a firm's IP portfolio, renewing patents whose values are highly uncertain ex ante due to their fast technological clockspeed is a relatively small price to pay for firms seeking to benefit from the upside potential of those patents. In contrast, the downside of renewing such patents are constrained by the mere costs associated with the renewal.
Hypothesis 4. Firms are more likely to renew patents in technology areas with faster technological clockspeed.
Methods
Sample and Data Sources
We take the population of U. Python, we merged the five databases into one large dataset. The combined dataset contains information on patent renewal decisions of a firm, firm(s) that owns a patent, code(s) and year(s) that the patent renewal fees were paid, information on patent filings and grants, the U.S. patent class and subclass to which the patent is assigned, and a list of citations to prior art on which the patent builds.
We focus on patent renewals between 1990 (first-time renewal decisions for patents granted in reflects the arrangement of knowledge in discrete taxonomic technological domains based on their homogeneity, whereas the entire patent consists of the claims it makes (Tong and Frame 1994) . The greater number of patent claims connotes both the greater possible application areas for the patent and the greater variance in its potential (Lanjouw and Schankerman 1999 
Control Variables.
We control for a number of variables that could influence patent renewal decisions. Specifically, we create a series of binary variables for country of patent assignee origin, industry, and year of patent approval decision. A large firm is likely to attach less importance to one particular patent, whereas a small firm is likely to place more importance on a particular patent (Sichelman and Graham 2010) . We thus include two binary indicator variables for small and micro firms according to the USPTO firm-size classification scheme, keeping large firms as the baseline category. We control for the number of patent ownership, measuring the total number of patents granted to a firm between 1987 and 2006. Overall, we expect that larger firms and those with a larger number of patents would renew their patents at a lower proportion.
We also control for backward and forward citations. Backward citation measures the number of prior art citations by a given patent. Patents that cite fewer prior art will draw on a narrower scope of knowledge in that the scope of prior art citations indicates the extent of intellectual influence of prior knowledge on the citing patents. The knowledge recombination in patents with few backward citations may produce knowledge of lower value (Harhoff et al. 1999 (Harhoff et al. , 2003 We control for originality of a patent (Hall Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001) , measuring the degree to which the patent represents a novel recombination of knowledge components from discrete technology classes. By counting the number of citations that a patent makes within each of the three-digit technology classes, the originality measures the degree to which the patent draws upon a broad set of technology classes. We expect that a high degree of originality to be associated with relatively high technological value. Finally, we control for whether a patent is co-owned by multiple entities as registered in the U.S. patent publication.
Analytical Approach
We employ logistic regression for our analysis because our dependent variable is a dichotomous variable.
To control for additional sources of unobserved heterogeneity within the sample, we include clustered standard errors by firm in the analyses.
Results
We observe that 1,931,204 patents out of 2,202,567 patents were renewed for the first time, representing about 87.68 percent of patents in our dataset. Of the first-time renewed patents, 1,517,777 were renewed again for the second time (i.e., between 7th and 8th year from grant dates of a patent), accounting for a 78.59 percent renewal rate (68.91 percent out of our initial dataset). Of these second-time renewed patents, 1,055,113 were renewed for the third time and enjoyed the maximum life span of twenty years, representing a 69.52 percent renewal rate (47.9 percent of our initial dataset).
-----Insert Table 1 and 2 here. -----As shown in Table 1 , the median firm in the sample is a large entity (under the classification of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations that determine a particular status depending on the number of the patent applicant's employees that determines the renewal fees to be paid to the USPTO) and has 605
patents. The distribution of the total number of patents owned by a firm is highly right-skewed because the top 25-percentile firm has 4,735 patents during our sample period. This implies that a mere 12.39 percent firms (i. Because ensuing patent renewal decisions after the first renewal are restricted to the prior renewed sample, only sub-samples of renewed patents in the previous renewal period for the second and the third renewals are useful for examining patterns of patent renewal decisions. Hence, we will primarily interpret the logit regression results in Table 3 Comparing the full models from each-phase renewal, the signs and statistical significance of coefficients for technological fragmentariness and breadth of technological opportunity remain consistent, whereas the signs and statistical significance of coefficients for technological familiarity and technological clockspeed are changed for subsequent renewal decisions. The coefficient of technological familiarity became negative and not statistically significant for the third renewal. Interestingly, technological clockspeed, of which the coefficient was not statistically significant in the estimation of the first renewal, becomes positive and statistically significant for the second and third renewals. Perhaps firms can make more confident patent renewal decisions for those patents with little or no value when technological clockspeed is fast in their first renewal decisions, because the intrinsic value of those patents is more likely to be manifested with the lapse of time for fast-moving technologies. That is, firms appear to exercise their abandonment option at a higher proportion in the first renewal period when technological clockspeed is high. However, conditional on a patent being renewed in its first renewal period, perhaps our theory on the real options value of fast-moving technologies appear to take an effect.
Excluding technological clockspeed, the magnitude of coefficients for other explanatory variables decreases as each renewal proceeds sequentially. It is likely that firms can better assess the value of patents over time, because the potential use of those patents becomes more perceivable.
-----Insert Figures 1 and 2 here. ----- (p=0.663). We conclude from this result that the relationship between technological clockspeed and the first patent renewal is negative but statistically not significant. Figure 2 plots the predicted probabilities of the first patent renewal based on relevant ranges using minimum and maximum values for each of the four explanatory variables. We present min-max ranges because these four variables are highly skewed and the usual analysis using values derived from plus and minus one standard deviation from the means occasionally fall outside the actual ranges of our explanatory variables. Overall, our analyses of predicted probabilities based on relevant ranges of our explanatory variables indicate that the changes in the predicted probabilities are economically meaningful.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we proposed theory and empirical evidence on conditions under which firms are more likely to renew their patents. We conjectured that firms attempt to develop patent thickets and consider patents as real options when considering their renewal decisions. As such, firms are more likely to renew their patents when a patent is in their familiar area of expertise or in technologically fragmented market, and when they perceive a greater breadth in terms of technological opportunities or high technological clockspeed. Our empirical results supported all hypotheses except the one related to technological clockspeed.
Three contributions to the innovation and technology management literature emerge. First, previous studies on patent renewal have investigated the patent renewal data (Pakes et al. 1989 , Serrano 2010 ) and the optimality of the patent renewal system (Scotchmer 1999) . These studies analyzed patent renewal decisions at an aggregate level and focused on providing descriptive statistics for the phenomenon. Only recently, studies have begun considering firm-level patent renewal decisions (e.g., Khanna et al. 2018) . Our study joins this strand of research by focusing on strategically-motivated antecedents of a firm's patent renewal decisions.
Second, we bring a real options perspective for firms managing IPR. Under varying degrees of discrete dimensions of uncertainty, firms can consider the patent renewals as an IPR management tool to seek either technological growth or technological safeguard, which can offer real options on emerging technologies. Beyond patenting decisions of firms for IPR protection and defensive mechanism (Somaya 2003 , Tennent 2009 ), real options uniquely transpire from patent renewal decisions considering actual opportunities by which firms may realize. Our setting allows us to distinguish between two types of uncertainties that play important roles in patent renewal decisions. Firms attempt to build their own local patent thickets to mitigate behavioral uncertainty of other firms in infringing IPR and to defend disputed technological areas protected by overlapping patent rights. In contrast, technological and environmental uncertainties confer high value on patent renewals as real options. In this regard, strategic decisions on patent renewal is twofold. Drawing on a real options perspective, we hypothesize the determinants of the choice between patent renewal and abandonment. The real options perspective has provided a lens to probe firms' investment under uncertainty, such as risk-taking initiatives and technology investment (Hurry Miller and Bowman 1992 , McGrath 1997 , McGrath and Nerkar 2004 . Firms making sequential resource commitments in patent renewal may frequently confront non-negligible uncertainty and the renewal investments are embedded with the real options, whose value is intensified in proportion to the degree of uncertainty. Specifically, we examine the conditions of breadth of technological opportunity and technological change velocity. Growing research pursues a value estimation approach to investigating a firm's sequential resource-allocation decisions on patent renewal, such as the estimated value of holding patent stocks (Pakes 1986) , the value estimation of the proprietary IP rights , and the rate of depreciation of technological knowledge (Bosworth and Jobome 2003) . Our study contributes to For scholars of innovation and technology management, several implications arise from this research. A firm's ability to identify and mitigate technological uncertainty by renewing current IPR needs not to necessarily translate into generating or boosting economic rents from these intangible assets.
Economically rational agents owning such intangible assets would have their patents be renewed only when the aggregate value of direct and indirect potential benefits is greater than their associated expenses.
Heterogeneous strategic incentives are likely to be embedded in the renewed patents and the decision on the renewal is likely to be consonant with a firm's IPR management strategy. As indicated in the findings of this research, some of the firms that are well known for a high number of patenting activities are also the ones that abandon their patents the most. For instance, IBM was granted 7,481 U.S. patents and abandoned 3,064 patents in the year of 2014 only and its compound annual growth rate in patent abandonment is 13.9 percent as of 2005 (Ellis 2016 
